In a model of price competition single-product¯rms compete for consumers. Consumers purchase a variable quantity of one of the di®erentiated goods. The paper provides results on equilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the di®erentiated goods among each other, their evaluation of the di®erentiated goods relative to the outside good, and heterogeneous in income. Furthermore, I provide su±cient conditions for dominance solvability and monotone comparative statics.
Introduction
Consider a di®erentiated oligopoly with a¯nite number of one-product¯rms competing in prices. It is known since the work of Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) that there are robust non-existence results of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose that there exists a market with two types of consumers characterized by their individual demand function. Even if equilibrium existence can be shown in any market with a single type of consumers non-existence might result in the presence of two types. The problem of non-existence of equilibrium is due to a lack of restrictions derived for market, i.e. aggregate, demand. The lack of restrictions on market demand can be seen as the most fundamental problem in establishing a general theory of price competition in partial equilibrium. A foundation of imperfect competition then consists of the analysis of models which go beyond a representative consumer speci¯cation or particular examples with heterogeneous consumers and which address and partially resolve the problem. Given the importance of imperfect competition in¯elds such as industrial organization, international trade, economic geography, and regional science such models and the insights they provide might be of interest to a wide audience.
In order to establish existence of equilibrium previous work has concentrated on models in which the best response correspondences of the¯rms are convex-valued. In the framework of discrete choice with unit demand or unit elastic demand, positive results have been obtained by Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b) , Dierker (1991) , and Peitz (1997) . The theme of their and my paper is that distributional assumptions can generate strong regularities of aggregate demand. The main contribution of this paper is to avoid functional form assumptions on individual demand and to show the existence of equilibrium in a heterogeneous population.
Discrete choice means that each consumer chooses only one out of a set of di®er-entiated goods and is an interesting case which applies to a wide range of consumer goods, for which consumers do not have a preference for variety (for an exploration of discrete choice models of product di®erentiation see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) . A consumer in my model buys only one type of good in a market depending on the relative prices between the goods. The quantity which consumers buy depends on the relevant price. Consumers are heterogeneous in three respects:
(1) they have di®erent critical relative prices when one good becomes more valuable than another, (2) their demand functions for each good conditional on buying the particular good di®er between consumers and (3) they have di®erent income. To model demand heterogeneity I take Grandmont's (1993) parametrization of demand. Demand heterogeneity is split into two parts: consumers have di®erent rescaling parameters of the units of measurement compared to a base type and there exist di®erent base types in the population. Grandmont has shown that heterogeneity of demand behavior with respect to a parameter gives rise to aggregate demand which is \close" to unit elastic demand, i.e. the price sensitivity of market expenditure is small. Note that a market in which total expenditure reacts rather insensitive to price changes makes the partial equilibrium modeling attractive. This regularity of the aggregate will turn out to be important in my model of price competition.
Since consummers can switch between the di®erentiated goods, total expenditure on a single di®erentiated goods can react very sensitive to price changes. The heterogeneity in the discrete choice between the di®erentiated goods is characterized by a log-concave density over switching points (following Nalebu®, 1991b, and Dierker, 1991) . This restriction is useful and encompasses a wide range of density function (see section 2). In the model strengthening the assumption on the concavity of switching parameters allows for less heterogeneous demand behavior, which means that aggregate demand is further away from the unit-elastic case. Income heterogeneity in my model will not place restrictions on aggregate demand but in contrast to models with unit demand does not lead to problems of equilibrium existence (see Peitz, 1999) . I interpret the model as a model of short-run competition in prices. The property that the di®erentiated goods are not perfect substitutes in the aggregate is due to the heterogeneity of switching points of the consumers. This heterogeneity can be explained by intrinsic di®erences in tastes (as in the literature on product di®erenti-ation, see e.g. Eaton and Lipsey, 1989) , random decision making (or random utility, see e.g. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992) , which may be due to heterogeneous information, or previous consumption decisions leading to heterogeneous switching costs (for other explanations of switching costs see Klemperer, 1995 ).
In the model, which is described in detail in section 2, I show that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices when there is heterogeneity amongst consumers (section 3). I present four formalizations: (1) bounded rational¯rms ("-maximizers), (2) bounded rational consumers (with an error in the decision rule), (3) pro¯t maximizing¯rms which have to reach a minimal market share, (4) rational consumers and¯rms with the corresponding existence results in Theorems 1 to 4. The main results of the paper is Theorem 4.
Under an additional distributional assumption the associated game (with bounded rational consumers) is log-supermodular and dominance solvable (section 4). Quasisupermodularity allows me to show existence which is not based on the convexvaluedness of the best response correspondence (Proposition 2). In addition, section 4 presents results on comparative statics which are implied by the properties of the pro¯t functions: higher marginal costs and increased sales taxes imply higher equilibrium prices of all¯rms. Section 5 concludes.
The model
I consider a market with a¯nite number of di®erentiated goods. The set of goods is denoted by N = f1; : : : ; ng. Each good i 2 N has a price p i > 0. There are other goods in the economy but their prices are¯xed. These other goods are captured by the composite commodity 0 which has the normalized price index p 0´1 . The existence of other markets is important because market expenditure is allowed to be price-dependent. For¯xed total income and no other markets this could not be the case.
Consumers
A consumer with¯xed income w > 0 has a utility function with arguments x 0 ; x where x is the collection of di®erentiated goods x = (x i ) i2N 2 < n + . I consider utility functions according to which discrete choice will result. In particular, I impose that preferences in the subspace of di®erentiated goods are linear for any given quantity x 0 and the slope is independent of x 0 .
where µ i1 are parameters with µ 11 = 0 (see below).
Each consumer maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint. This can be interpreted as going through the following program. She¯rst decides which good to buy taking only the relative prices p j =p i , i; j 2 N into account. She buys for instance good 1 and none of the other di®erentiated goods if log p i ¡ log p 1¸µ1i for all i > 1. The parameter µ ij is referred to as a switching point and is the logarithmic critical price ratio at which a consumer is indi®erent between goods i and j. At prices p a consumer is going to buy good i
The set of switching parameters µ ij , i; j; k 2 N satis¯es µ ij = ¡µ ji , µ kj +µ ji = µ ki , and µ ii = 0. Hence, a vector µ 1 = (µ 12 ; : : : ; µ 1n ) determines all µ ij , which are introduced in order to make the presentation symmetric for the goods i 6 = 1. At the second step, a consumer chooses according to her utility function u. She decides on the level of expenditure considering only the price of the good she is actually buying from.
A consumer is characterized by her utility function u and slopes of the indi®er-ence curves between the di®erentiated goods fully determined by µ 1 . Since I want to work with demand functions which are continuous, I assume that u is continuously di®erentiable. In addition, I assume that consumers always choose in the interior of the consumption set < 2 + when maximizing u. Note that quasi-linear preferences are ruled out by this assumption. Formally, lim e x i !0 (@u(e x i ; x 0 )=@x i ) = 1 and lim e x 0 !0 (@u(x i ; e x 0 )=@x 0 ) = 1. This implies that the nonnegativity constraints x 0 ; x i¸0 are automatically satis¯ed when maximizing the utility function u subject to p i x i + x 0 · w.
A consumer's budget constraint reads p¢x+x 0 · w where p = (p i ) i2N . Consumers maximize their utility
Individual demand functions » i (p; w) for each good i 2 N are obtained as
arg max
and log p j ¡ log p i > µ ij for all j < i 0 e l s e .
To avoid correspondences I assumed that the consumer rather buys from the good with a smaller index at a relative price equal to the switching point µ ij . As consumers will be assumed to be di®erent and mass points for a distribution over the switching points will be excluded, demand can be arbitrary at the switching point without changing the result. Consumer choice has been derived from utility maximization. As explained below, the approach is compatible with demand functions which are not derived from utility maximization.
From Individual to Aggregate Demand
Up to now every consumer was described by a collection of switching points µ 1 , an income w > 0, and a utility function u. Along the lines of Grandmont (1987 Grandmont ( , 1992 Grandmont ( , 1993 ) I de¯ne classes or types of consumers by a speci¯c parametrization of preferences or demand and consider heterogeneity with respect to a parameter inside such a class.
1 Only di®erences within each class will play a role. Demand functions are parametrized as follows. A consumer is said to be of type a 2 A if there is a rescaling parameter¯2 < such that u(e ¡¯x 1 ; x 0 ) coincides with the utility function of the base consumer and if the consumer has the same income as the base consumer. In an abuse of notation I now introduce more arguments into the utility function. The utility function of a base consumer of type a is written as u(a; 0; x 1 ; x 0 ). The value of a utility function of a consumer with parameterī s written as u(a;¯; x 1 ; x 0 ) = u(a; 0; e ¡¯x 1 ; x 0 ). Conditional demand functions are ³(a;¯; p 1 )´arg max x 1 u(a;¯; x 1 ; w ¡ p 1 x 1 ). It follows that ³(a;¯; p 1 ) = e¯³(a; 0; e¯p 1 ):
Consumers of the same type a have the same conditional demand function ³ up to a rescaling of the units of measurement. Each consumer of type a can now be described by a rescaling parameter¯, a generating demand function ³, and parameters of switching µ 1 . Since I am only working with conditional demand functions ³ it does not really matter whether they are derived from utility maximization or re°ect, for instance, rules of thumb. Individual demand is
where µ i = (µ i1 ; : : : ; µ i;i¡1 ; µ i;i+1 ; : : : µ i;n ) and Â i is an indicator function de¯ned as
1 if log p j ¡ log p i¸µij for all j > i and log p j ¡ log p i > µ ij for all j < i 0 else Consumers of the same income are heterogeneous in two respects. They have di®erent switching points and their demand functions are di®erent. Assumptions on the population are formally stated for later reference. (A.1) contains assumptions on distributions over the switching points (µ ij ) j2N;j6 =i . Denote
² (A.1). For all i 2 N: there exist continuous distribution functions G i over µ i 2 < n¡1 with G i (0) = 1=n. G i has a density g i which is positive and continuously di®erentiable on int £ i . g i has bounded support £ i , i.e. µ ij < µ ij for some j 2 N; j 6 = i implies G i (µ i ) = 0, and µ ij > µ ij for all j 2 N; j 6 = i implies G i (µ i ) = 1. g i and @g i (µ i )=@µ ij , j 6 = i, are uniformly bounded from above on int £ i .
For convenience, I assume that G i (0) = 1=n which is not restrictive because I am free to choose the units of measurement of the di®erentiated goods. I want to work with twice continuously di®erentiable pro¯t functions. For this reason the di®erentiability assumptions are made. The assumption that g i is positive on int £ i implies that (@=@µ ij )G i (µ i ) 6 = 0 for all j 6 = i. Hence, I will analyze a model of \global competition", i.e. a price change of a di®erentiated good has an e®ect on the demand of all other di®erentiated goods.
I assume that g i , i 2 N has a bounded support because I need that mean expenditure on a good turns su±ciently fast to zero for its corresponding price turning to in¯nity while holding the other prices¯xed. The assumption of a bounded support says that for given prices p ¡i one can always¯nd a price p i su±ciently large such that mean expenditure on good i is equal to zero. I make use of this assumption in order to establish bounds for the price-sensitivity of mean expenditure and in order to construct compact strategy sets. For the latter it is convenient but not necessary (see Caplin and Nalebu®, 1991b , for a result with unbounded support). If the intervals [µ ij ; µ ij ] degenerated to a single point all consumers would be identical with respect to the switching point. In such a case also mean expenditure is discontinuous; it is the Bertrand case with homogeneous goods. On the other hand, if, for all i 2 N , g i had unbounded support there would be a positive demand left for any price combination p and each good with its index in N . The assumption of a rectangular support is made for convenience; it is only important that the support is convex. Note that for any price vector p,
Partial derivatives of G i are de¯ned accordingly on the boundary.
Important for the calculations is stochastic independence of the three components describing the population of consumers.
² (A.2). a,¯, and µ 1 are stochastically independent.
(A.2) implies that consumers in a particular segment of the di®erentiated market, formalized by µ 1 , do not systematically di®er from the rest of the population in their expenditure functions in the market. The next assumption is made in order to integrate over individual demand functions.
² (A.3).
(1) A is a separable metric space of types, ¹ is a probability measure on A.
(2) For each type a there exists a conditional distribution over¯with density f . (3) Income w a > 0 depends continuously on type a and average income is nite, i.e.
Under (A.1)-(A.3) mean demand of good i reads
denotes conditional mean expenditure of type µ 1 . It will be important to show that conditional mean expenditure reacts slowly to a price change. In the work of Dierker (19991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b, subsection 8.2) it was assumed that conditional mean expenditure is a constant. In this paper I do not make such an assumption or any shape assumptions on individual demand functions (for a discussion see the conclusion).
Remark 1 >From the de¯nition of individual demand it follows that conditional mean expenditure B(p i ; µ i1 ) only depends on log p i ¡ µ i1 , i.e.
@B(p
Firms Firm behavior is standard: good i, i 2 N, is produced by¯rm i with constant marginal costs c i > 0. Each¯rm faces a mean demand function X i (p) depending on the prices in the market. Each¯rm is a price setter. The strategic variable, price p i , is chosen as the best response to the prices of the other¯rms. For prices above marginal costs¯rms will satisfy demand. Pro¯ts are given as
Equilibrium
In the paper I look at pure-strategy Nash equilibria in prices. A pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices p
In other words, p ¤ i is an element of the best response correspondence for p ¤ ¡i .
Equilibrium existence and demand heterogeneity
The main problem to show existence in models of price competition is to establish the quasi-concavity of pro¯t functions. I show this property to hold on a compact set of prices and prove that¯rms never set prices outside this set. In particular, I
show that heterogeneous demand behavior implies that mean expenditure B(p i ; µ i1 ) does not depend strongly on its price. Inserting mean demand into the pro¯t functions gives pro¯t functions which depend on prices and the characteristics of the market. It will be helpful to consider logarithmic pro¯ts. Denote B 0 (p i ) = B(p i ; 0).
The pro¯t function consists of four additive terms. The¯rst existence result shows that an oligopoly with pro¯t functions consisting of the¯rst two terms has an equilibrium and that the last two terms are negligible under su±cient heterogeneity. The second result interprets pro¯t functions consisting of the¯rst three additive terms as the presented model with the only di®erence that consumers are bounded rational. The third and fourth result show equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions as stated in equation (1) . I will show that the respective pro¯t functions are quasiconcave on a compact set of prices. In contrast to Dierker (1991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b) , in speci¯cations 2 to 4 I cannot show that pro¯t functions are quasi-concave for all prices so that the construction of compact strategy spaces is of particular importance. The outline of this section then is as follows: the¯rst theorem establishes equilibrium existence with bounded rational¯rms (subsection 3.1), the second equilibrium with bounded rational consumers (subsection 3.2), the third existence result holds for pro¯t maximizing¯rms which have to satisfy a minimal market share and the fourth and main result allows for fully rational consumers and¯rms without restrictions (both subsection 3.3). Theorems 1 to 4 say that if the densities over switching parameters are log-concave and if demand behavior is heterogeneous then there exists an equilibrium.
Bounded rational¯rms
Considering the four additive terms of the pro¯t function (1) I start with the¯rst term which satis¯es the following concavity property:
The second derivative with respect to log p i is bounded from above by some negative number when prices are chosen from a compact strategy space.
The fact of the negative upper bound of the second derivative on a compact set will be important below. Because of Remark 2 one only has to worry about the second to fourth term in the pro¯t function (1) . In this paper two kinds of heterogeneity will be important. First, heterogeneity with respect to µ i implies that consumers have di®erent relative prices at which they are indi®erent between a pair of goods. Second, heterogeneity with respect to u, formalized by a distribution over , will be crucial in making expenditure less price-sensitive in the aggregate than it is on the individual level.
First, I make an assumption on the heterogeneity of µ i in order to take care of the second term in (1).
In particular Caplin and Nalebu® (1991a) discuss which distributions have logconcave densities. They also give the relevant references. For example the Normal and, with parameter restrictions, the multivariate Beta distribution have log-concave densities. Results carry over to truncations with convex support.
Following the work of Dierker (1991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b) also the second term is log-concave in logarithmic price if the density has this property. This result is stated as Lemma 1 (for the proof see the appendix.). One of the aggregation theorems of Pr ¶ ekopa (1973) underlies the result. Dierker (1991) and Caplin and Nalebu® (1991b) were to my knowledge the¯rst who applied the aggregation results of Pr ¶ ekopa and Borell to models of imperfect competition.
In this section I analyze pro¯t functions of the form (1) looking for a generalized version of Nash equilibrium. A pure strategy Bertrand-Nash "-equilibrium is a vector of prices p
Firms are not maximizers but do not bother to change their strategy if such a deviation increases pro¯ts by a factor " or less. Firms which are "-maximizers can be labelled bounded rational. The reason for not fully maximizing pro¯ts can be motivated by measurement errors such as accounting errors (which are proportional to the level of pro¯t). In the pure Bertrand model Baye and Morgan (1996) obtain results on "-equilibria (with additive "). Consequently, equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions, which are the sum of thē rst and the second term, implies the existence of "-equilibria if the third and the fourth term in (1) can be made arbitrarily small. As will be stated by the following two lemmas this is implied by su±cient heterogeneity with respect to¯. Assumption (A.5) says that there is a strict lower bound of expenditure B(p i ; µ i1 ) for all µ i1 2 [µ i1 ; µ i1 ]. This means that the aggregate of consumers with a particular switching parameter spends a positive minimum budget share in the di®erentiated market. A similar assumption is also made in Grandmont (1992 Grandmont ( , 1993 and is needed in the proofs of several lemmata.
If there was only one type (a;¯= 0) in the market, conditional demand of the form ³(a; 0; With (A.6) I assume uniform integrability over¯. The average slope in absolute value m 1 serves as a measure of heterogeneity, 0 < m 1 < 1 for distributions with unbounded support. A small m 1 stands for a \°at" distribution and thus for a large heterogeneity of demand with respect to the parameter¯(see Kneip, 1993) .
exists a real number m 1 such that Z
The next lemma puts an arbitrarily small bound on the price elasticity of mean expenditure B 0 (p i ).
Lemma 2 Under (A.1),(A.2),(A.5),(A.6) the following inequality holds
Proof.
Substitute as in Grandmont (1993) 
The lemma implies that j log B 0 (p 0 i ) ¡ log B 0 (p i )j can be made arbitrarily small on a compact set of prices if the average absolute value of the slope of the density is small, i.e. if m 1 is small. When price p i is chosen from a compact strategy set [c i ; z] then, for¯rm i, deviations from equilibrium pro¯ts are bounded above by the factor (z ¡ c i )(m 1 =±) when only the third term is taken into account.
The last term of pro¯t function (1) is rewritten as
which implicitly de¯nes R. This term can be made arbitrarily small if R is close to zero.
Lemma 3 Under (A.1),(A.2),(A.5),(A.6). Then R can be bounded in absolute value by any positive number if m 1 is su±ciently small, in particular, the bound (µ i1 ¡ µ i1 )m 1 =± is never broken by¯rm i.
Proof.
Since by (A.5) B 0 (p i ) is bounded from below it is su±cient to show that jB(p i ; µ i1 ) ¡ B 0 (p i )j can be made arbitrarily small. Because of Remark 1, (A.1), (A.2), (A.5), and (A.6) imply that
Consequently,
Since µ i1 has compact support this term can be made arbitrarily small. An explicit bound depending on the measure of heterogeneity is derived by the following
On a compact set of prices Lemma 1 is used to show the existence of an equilibrium for pro¯t functions consisting of terms 1 and 2. With Lemmas 2 and 3 one can show that such an equilibrium is an "-equilibrium. In the proof I have to show that¯rms will choose from a compact set of prices. In order to show this I use that the switching parameters have a compact support. I de¯ne log z´max
Theorem 1 says that under the above assumptions an "-equilibrium exists if consumers are su±ciently heterogeneous with respect to their conditional demand functions.
Theorem 1 Assume (A.1)-(A.4). There exists an equilibrium for pro¯t functions
. Assume in addition (A.5) and (A.6). For any " > 0 there exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash "-equilibrium if m 1 is sufciently small.
Proof. First, equilibrium existence for pro¯t functions as the sums of the¯rst and second additive term of the right-hand side of (1) is shown for given compact strategy sets. Lemmata 1 and 4 (the latter in the Appendix) then say that these pro¯t functions are quasi-concave for given compact strategy sets. In Lemma 5 Kakutani's¯xed point theorem is applied for given compact strategy sets. Lemma 6 shows that¯rms will always choose out of these strategy sets. Lemmata 4 to 6 are delegated to the appendix. For compact strategy sets Lemma 2 implies that the third term of di®erences of logarithmic pro¯t function (1) can be made arbitrarily small for m 1 su±ciently small. Lemma 3 implies that di®erences in logarithmic pro¯t functions of the fourth term are arbitrarily small for m 1 su±ciently small. Hence, by Lemmata 2 and 3 an equilibrium strategy for pro¯t functions as the sums of thē rst and second term of (1) are "-maximal, " > 0, for m 1 su±ciently small: Denote equilibrium pro¯ts of¯rm i with ¼ ¤ i and pro¯ts after a price change
for m 1 su±ciently small because log(1 + jRj) < jRj < ¡ log(1 ¡ jRj). 2
Bounded rational consumers
At this point I present and discuss an alternative formulation of consumer behavior which is not fully rational but may be called bounded rational. Consumers buy according to the same conditional demand function ³(p i ; w) independent of the switching parameters µ. Each consumer splits the decision problem into two parts (two stage decision problem):¯rst how much to demand of a good in the di®erentiated market and second to decide which of the di®erentiated goods to buy.
2 Ex ante goods are identical, i.e. consumers maximize u(x 0 ; P n i=1 x i ) under their budget constraint. Their demand without an error is » i (p; w) = ³(p i ; w) if p i < p j , for all j 6 = i, and » i (p; w) = 0 if p i > p j , for some j 6 = i. Introducing a vector of errors e i , i 2 N, which is drawn independently across consumers from a probability distribution with compact support, generates preferences for a particular di®erentiated good. If the realization of e i > 0, a consumer is willing to pay a higher price for the good than without error. Consumers do not make systematic errors if Ee i = 0 for all i 2 N. De¯ne switching points µ i1 = e 1 ¡ e i . Demand with the error included is assumed to be of the form » i (p; w) = ³(p i ; w) if log p i < log p j ¡ µ ij , for all j 6 = i, and » i (p; w) = 0 if log p i > log p j ¡ µ ij , for some j 6 = i. This means that consumers derive demand for good i conditional on buying none of the other di®erentiated goods from maximizing u(x i ; x 0 ) s.t. p i x i + x 0 · w but make an error in the decision which good to buy, i.e. they do not necessarily buy the cheapest one in the market. This may be interpreted as a consumer being imperfectly informed about prices when making the decision which good to buy but once this decision is made (trip to thē rm's factory) the consumer observes perfectly the price of the good chosen and maximizes utility. Errors in the decision rule have been discussed in the literature e.g. in Tversky (1972) . My formulation leads to pro¯t functions
² (A.7). f is twice continuously di®erentiable with f 0 and f 00 uniformly integrable, i.e. there exists a minimal real number m 2 such that Z
Under this assumption which is stronger than (A.6), m 2 serves as the measure of demand heterogeneity. The following lemma provides bounds for the price sensitivity of mean expenditure (expressed as elasticity and sensitivity of the elasticity). 
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2 I substitute r =¯+ log p i in the expression of B 0 (p i ). Taking¯rst and second derivatives as in Grandmont (1993) gives
Theorem 2 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7). In the model with pro¯t functions (2) there exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium if m 2 is su±ciently small.
Sketch of the proof. Again I have to show that¯rms will choose from a compact set of prices. In order to show this in Lemma 8 in the appendix, I use that mean expenditure is bounded, that m 2 is su±ciently small, and that the switching parameters have a compact support. I need that m 2 is su±ciently small in the case that there does not exist a price p i above which the mean expenditure function B 0 is monotone. In the case of monotonicity above some price level, I can do without m 2 being small and bound di®erences in mean expenditure due to the convergence of mean expenditure (which follows from the bounds of mean expenditure). By Remark 2 the second derivative in logarithmic price of the¯rst term of (2) is bounded by some negative number. Hence, since by Lemma 7 the second derivative of the third term can be made arbitrarily small in absolute value one can show the quasi-concavity of pro¯t functions for m 2 su±ciently small and g log-concave on the compact set of prices from which¯rms will choose according to Lemma 8 in the appendix. 2
Note that in the construction of compact strategy sets (Lemma 8) I use the condition that m 2 is small. This allows me to consider the same compact strategy set as in the previous subsection. From the argument in part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 2 below it follows that it is not necessary to assume that m 2 is small in order to construct compact strategy sets.
Remark 3 At this point it seems to be appropriate to discuss the trade-o® between the two di®erent kinds of heterogeneity. As stated in Remark 2 there exists a negative number such that @ 2 log(p i ¡ c i )=p i )=(@ log p i ) 2 is bounded from above by that number on a compact set. Note that this makes it possible to show equilibrium existence even if G i is not log-concave. With pro¯t functions (2) one can show equilibrium existence as long as there exists some · > 0 such that
Denote the set of prices 
Remark 4 If the second derivative of log G i in log p i is su±ciently negative then conditional mean expenditure is allowed to react more sensitive on prices, i.e. m 2 is not necessarily \small". Hence in order to allow for less demand heterogeneity (m 2 not \small") G i has to be·¡strict log-concave. For· big, the inequality cannot be satis¯ed for densities g i over µ i if their supports are \large". Restricting the support implies that consumers are more homogeneous with respect to their switching parameters. In addition to the possibility of a big·, a smaller support of µ i makes the price setting more competitive and the compact set of prices P smaller. Hence, also the second derivative of the price-cost margin (in logarithms) can be bounded from above by a negative number which is greater in absolute value as the support is reduced.
Remark 5 In a duopoly there exist· > 0 such that the assumption of log-concavity of g 1 ; (A.4), implies that G i is·¡strict log-concave if g 1 (µ) is bounded from below on [µ; µ], which is for example satis¯ed if g 1 is uniform or truncated Normal. This is shown in the appendix.
To conclude this subsection, I summarize the previous Remarks 3 and 4 by a suggestive statement: in order to show existence of equilibrium a less diverse expenditure pattern (m 2 bigger) has to go hand in hand with less diversity of errors in the decision rule (support of g i smaller). An additional result on equilibrium existence is provided in subsection 4.1 below.
Rational¯rms and consumers
In this subsection I¯rst consider pro¯t functions of the form (1) in which¯rms are pro¯t maximizers under the constraint that they sell to a minimal share of consumers, i.e. G i¸² . Afterwards this restriction on the strategies is no longer imposed.
It will be useful to rewrite pro¯t function (1) .
As is known from Lemma 7 the second derivative of the second term can be made arbitrarily small. Although G i is log-concave (by Lemma 1) the third additive term in (3) is not necessarily concave. To save some space let me denote
In order to show that pro¯t functions are log-concave on a compact support I have to show that second derivative of log(D(q i )+E(q i )), q i´l og p i , can be bounded from above by some positive number arbitrarily close to 0. Hence it has to be shown that for any ² > 0 there exists an m 2 such that
(A.4) it has to be shown that
Without a positive lower bound on D(q i ) the right-hand side of this inequality cannot be bounded from below by some positive number. This implies that without further assumptions one cannot¯nd, for all ² > 0, an m 2 (depending on ²) such that this inequality is satis¯ed for all prices in P . As shown in Lemma 9 in the appendix, if there is a positive lower bound for D(q i ) one can make the left-hand side arbitrarily small and bound the right-hand from below by some positive number. With a minimal market share I obtain a positive lower bound for D(q i ). Imposing a minimal market share is appropriate in markets in which¯rms have to have a critical mass in order to survive. Results are una®ected when instead of consumer mass, expenditure shares, i.e. p i X i =( P j p j X j )¸², or demand shares are considered. One justi¯cation can be that¯rms are run by managers and managerial incentives include minimal market share (due to dynamic considerations). Such markets also include markets with strong network externalities where there exists a critical market size below which consumers do not¯nd the product useful.
² (A.8) There exists a ' > 0 such that log c j ¡ log c i 2 (µ ij + '; µ ij ¡ '); i; j 2 N; i < j Theorem 3 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.8). There exist minimal market shares such that the model with minimal market shares has a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in which all¯rms are active if m 2 is su±ciently small.
Sketch of Proof.
Similar to the one of Theorem 2. (A.8) implies that all¯rms are active in any candidate equilibrium and can reach some minimal budget shares ² i given prices above marginal costs by the competitors, G i (log c j ¡ log c i ) = ² iĢ i ((µ ij + ') j6 =i ). Due to Remark 2 and Lemmata 4, 7, and 9 (in the Appendix) one can show the quasi-concavity of pro¯t function on a compact set of prices if m 2 is su±ciently small. In order to bound the second derivative of log(D(q i ) + E(q i )) by a positive number arbitrarily small on a compact set for m 2 su±ciently small I need the log-concavity of G i , arbitrarily small bounds on di®erences jB(p i ; µ i1 ) ¡ B 0 (p i )j, and¯rst and second derivatives, and uniform bounds for g i and its partial derivatives. By Lemma 10 in the Appendix there exists such a compact set in which the prices of pro¯t-maximizing¯rms stay whatever the price-setting of the competitors. With this result equilibrium existence is proved in a world with rational¯rms and consumers. The trade-o® between the di®erent kinds of heterogeneity as pointed out in Remarks 3 and 4 also holds in this case. I assumed that¯rms satisfy a minimal market share. This restriction on the strategy set can be avoided under a stronger assumption on G i . Since the distribution function G i takes any value between 0 and 1 in order to show that pro¯t function ¼ i is log-concave in q i it would be su±cient to show that
This inequality holds for prices such that a¯rm has a negligible market share under the following assumption: ² (A.9). g i is uniformly bounded from below on int £ i , i 2 N. This assumption implies that @G i ((q j ¡ q i ) j6 =i )=@q i evaluated at µ i 2 fµ i 2 £ i j9j 6 = i : µ ij = µ ij g is bounded away from zero and so is dD(q i )=dq i . For example, any truncated Normal distribution on £ i satis¯es (A.9).
Under the additional assumption (A.9) equilibrium existence can be shown without the restriction of minimal market shares. I now state the main result of the paper. Like the previous results it formalizes the idea that aggregation reduces the price sensitivity of market expenditure and log-concave densities imply shape restrictions on the demand for each di®erentiated good so that pro¯t functions are \well-behaved" on a su±ciently large set of prices. It is the last step to show that this idea is compatible with fully rational consumers and¯rms without the need to impose any restrictions on the¯rms' strategy spaces. 
Further results with bounded rational consumers
In this section I derive further results on existence, uniqueness, and monotone comparative statics in which I make use of the properties of market demand. I restrict the analysis to the simplest case in which uniqueness can be obtained, i.e. I consider the case in which consumers are bounded rational and make errors in the decision making as speci¯ed in subsection 3.2. For the speci¯cations in subsection 3.3 the analysis is more complicated but possible along the same lines in order to show uniqueness.
On equilibrium existence and uniqueness
For more than two¯rms, I assume in addition that the distribution functions G i satisfy the weakly dominant diagonal property de¯ned below. This implies that the associated game is quasi-supermodular (Proposition 1). Equilibrium existence can then be shown independent of the demand heterogeneity measured by m 2 (Proposition 2). Assuming that di®erences in marginal costs lie in the support of the distribution over the switching points guarantees that all¯rms are active and make pro¯ts in an equilibrium. The uniqueness of the equilibrium (Theorem 5) is then proved by showing that logarithmic payo® functions satisfy the dominant diagonal property. The game is dominance solvable. It is convenient to write the model as the game ¡ = fN; P; (¼ i ; i 2 N )g where N is the¯nite set of¯rms, ¼ i the pro¯t function of¯rm i, and P is the set of strategy pro¯les, which was de¯ned as £ i2N [c i ; z] \ f(p i ) i2N j log p j ¡ log p i · µ ij g. Denote P i (p ¡i ) the strategy set of¯rm i given p ¡i . When prices in P are replaced by logarithmic prices the set is denoted by Q. The game with log-pro¯ts as payo® functions and logarithmic strategy sets is denoted by ¡ 0 = fN; Q; (log ¼ i ; i 2 N)g.
It will be shown that the model is a particular log-supermodular game. The game ¡ 0 is smooth supermodular if Q is a complete lattice and log ¼ i is twice di®erentiable with @ 2 log ¼ i (p)=@ log p i @ log p j¸0 , for all i; j 2 N , j 6 = i, and p 2 P (Topkis' Characterization Theorem). The game ¡ 0 exhibits strong strategic complementarity if @ 2 log ¼ i =@ log p i @ log p j > 0, for all i; j 2 N, j 6 = i and p 2 P .
The fruitfulness of the theory of supermodular games for economics has been recognized by Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990b) . One of the standard examples are simple models of price competition with di®erentiated products. In the present framework strategy sets depend on the choices of the other players which does not create any problems here (for a de¯nition and some results see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990a) . For an interpretation of strategic complementarity
In this section I introduce an additional assumption on the distribution of the µ i , i 2 N . Recall that h Proof. I check the conditions for smooth supermodularity of ¡ 0 . Given p ¡i , each price is chosen from a compact interval in < + . By construction, Q is a complete lattice. For i 2 N , log ¼ i is twice continuously di®erentiable (by the assumption of di®erentiability and due to the construction of Q). Cross derivatives are
see also Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) .
by (A.10) and Lemma 11 in the Appendix which says that G i is log-concave in log p j on its support. 2
Note that quasi-supermodularity can be shown on any set which is a complete lattice and which is a subset of £ i2N [c i ; 1) \ fpj log p j ¡ log p i · µ ij g. Note also that neither (A.5) nor m 2 \small" are assumed. This implies that one can show equilibrium existence independent of the individual conditional demand functions in the population although pro¯t functions are not necessarily quasi-concave (even on a compact set such as P ) if one can¯nd a compact set of strategy pro¯les. This is always possible.
Proposition 2 Assume (A.1)-(A.4),(A.7),(A.10).
There exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the speci¯cation with bounded rational consumers.
The proof is delegated to the appendix and is based on Tarski's¯xed point theorem. In the duopoly, the result is more general than Theorem 2. For more than twō rms (A.10) is not implied by log-concavity of g i and the assumption on switching parameters (A.10) replaces assumptions on the heterogeneity of conditional demand functions. Along the same lines equilibrium existence can also be shown in speci¯-cation 1 with bounded rational¯rms.
Below I establish the uniqueness of equilibrium. The following assumption says that marginal costs of the¯rms are not allowed to be too di®erent. ² (A.11). log c j ¡ log c i 2 (µ ij ; µ ij ), i; j 2 N; i < j.
(A.11) is weaker than (A.8). Under the assumption corner solutions can be excluded, i.e. all¯rms i 2 N will have positive market shares in equilibrium charging prices above there marginal costs and thus make pro¯ts.
Lemma 12 Assume (A.1)-(A.3),(A.11).
If there is a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium all¯rms are active and make positive pro¯ts in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that exactly one¯rm is inactive and show that this cannot be an equilibrium. The same argument applies for more than one inactive¯rm. (i) Assume¯rst that the inactive¯rm i chooses a price p i above marginal costs such that the other¯rms together serve the whole market. They will choose their prices such that log p j ¡ log p i = µ ij for all j 6 = i. Such a price p i cannot be a best response for¯rm i because by decreasing its price it can make positive pro¯ts.
(ii) Let¯rm i choose its price equal to marginal costs so that the competitors can only serve the whole market by setting some of the prices below marginal costs. This cannot be a best response of all competitors. They will set their prices above marginal cost because they still can obtain some share of the market. In such a situation it cannot be optimal for¯rm i to charge a price equal to marginal cost. (iii) Clearly,¯rms do not set prices below marginal costs in equilibrium because at least one of these¯rms has a positive market share and thus makes losses. 2 Consequently, for m 2 su±ciently small every equilibrium price p ¤ 2 int P and the analysis can be restricted to prices in P . Lemma 13 says that if there is su±cient heterogeneity of demand behavior measured by small m 2 , log-pro¯ts satisfy the dominant diagonal property. It is the last step to show uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof is delegated to the appendix.
Lemma 13 Assume (A.1)-(A.5),(A.7),(A.10),(A.11). If m 2 su±ciently small, then log-pro¯ts satisfy the dominant diagonal property in log-prices on Q, i.e.
If (A.10) is strengthened by making the left-hand side of the inequality by some ² greater than the right-hand side one can allow for less demand heterogeneity, i.e. m 2 can be greater. Proposition 1 and Lemma 13 put together give the uniqueness of equilibrium. A game is called dominance solvable if there exists only one serially undominated strategy pro¯le. Proof. By Lemmata 8 and 12 there does not exist an equilibrium outside the interior of P . Furthermore, prices outside P cannot belong to the set of serially undominated strategy pro¯les. In particular, one can use the proof of Lemma 8 in order to show that any price vector p with some component p i > z, i 2 N, is serially dominated. On P the dominant diagonal property holds. It implies that there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium p ¤ in the game ¡ 0 . Since, in addition, the game is smooth supermodular it is dominance solvable by Milgrom and Roberts (1990b, Theorem 5). Since serially undominated strategies are obtained by ordinal comparison and the transformation of the payo® functions is strictly increasing, the strategy pro¯le p ¤ is the unique serially undominated strategy pro¯le of the game ¡ and, consequently, the unique pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. 2
It is well known that dominance solvability gives a strong prediction of play. In particular, only serially undominated strategies can be rationalizable (as de¯ned by Bernheim, 1984) and only serially undominated strategies can be played with positive probability at a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or correlated equilibrium (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1991, on rationality requirements for the¯rms to play the dominance solution see Tan and Werlang, 1988) . Hence, p ¤ is the unique rationalizable strategy pro¯le and there are no other mixed-strategy Nash or correlated equilibria.
Monotone comparative statics
In the second part of this section I provide comparative statics results. Equilibrium prices are weakly increased as unit costs of one¯rm rise or as output taxes are increased. Under strong strategic complementarity they are strongly increased. To obtain comparative statics results I look at a family of games. Let the payo® functions and strategy sets be parametrized by a parameter ¿ 2 < K . Games in this family di®er only in the value ¿ takes. Denote Q i (q ¡i )¸Q 0 i (q ¡i ) if the maximal and the minimal element of Q i (q ¡i ) is larger than or equal to the corresponding element in Q 0 i (q ¡i ): Suppose that ¡ 0 (¿ ) = fN; Q(¿ ); (log ¼ i (¢; ¿); i 2 N); ¿ 2 < K g is a family of smooth supermodular games satisfying @ 2 log ¼ i =@ log p i @¿ k¸0 for all i; k and let
is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game then it is easy to show that A family of games ¡ 0 (¿ ) exhibits multiplier e®ects in the parameter ¿ k if the optimal reaction of each player is larger than its optimal reaction given the strategies of the other players, i.e. if d log p
for all¯rms and > 0 for at least one¯rm. It is easy to show the following result: assume that a family of games ¡(¿ ) has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for each ¿ , is smooth supermodular, exhibits strong strategic complementarity, and satis¯es @ 2 log ¼ i =@ log p i @¿ k¸0 for all i; k with strict inequality for at least one¯rm and let all strategy sets be nondecreasing in ¿ then the family of games exhibits multiplier e®ects. The magnitude of the multiplier e®ect depends on the sensitivity of strategy choices to shocks and on the strength of strategic complementarities. The¯rst comparative statics result is obtained for changes in the marginal cost c j of¯rm j. What happens to equilibrium prices p ¤ when unit cost c j is increased for some j 2 N? I look at the family of games ¡ 0 (c j ) = fN; Q(c j ),
where Q i (q ¡i; c j ) is the strategy set of¯rm i. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5 (with (A.10) valid for the range of cost parameters under consideration), equilibrium prices p ¤ are nondecreasing functions of unit cost
If, in addition, H i , i 2 N, has a strict dominant diagonal then the game ¡ 0 exhibits strong strategic complementarities and the family of games exhibits multiplier e®ects: a cost shock to one single¯rm is transmitted into price increases of all¯rms in the market. Suppose that the revenue of¯rm i is taxed by a tax t per unit of output sold. Pro¯ts of¯rm i are 
Conclusion
In models of imperfect competition the existence of equilibrium is far from guaranteed. Previous literature has looked at discrete choice models under particular functional form assumptions of individual demand. In this paper I replace functional form assumptions by heterogeneity of demand behavior. In particular, I show that aggregation along the lines of Grandmont is compatible with the discrete choice setup which is widely used in the theoretical and empirical literature. Future research has to show whether a more general version of aggregation can give rise to restrictions which are useful for the analysis of markets in which¯rms strategically interact. To summarize the main¯ndings of this paper, aggregation of a heterogeneous population of consumers leads to quasi-concave pro¯t functions on a compact set of prices and this property is used to show existence of equilibrium.
Some modi¯cations can be accommodated. As remarked in section 2, I analyzed a model of global competition in which each¯rm's price change has an e®ect on the demand of each competitor. The model is easily adjusted to allow for localized competition in which each¯rm only competes directly with a strict subset of the set of all competitors (this set can depend on the price vector p). For instance in a onedimensional model of product di®erentiation each¯rm has at most two neighbors (under a convexity assumption in the utility function, see e.g. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) . In such a model one can index¯rms such that¯rm i competes directly with¯rms i ¡ 1 and i + 1 if all¯rms are active. Some assumptions on the costs of production imply that all¯rms are active in any candidate equilibrium. Consider the hypothetical pro¯t function1 i (p i¡1 ; p i ; p i+1 ) of¯rm i when it is ignoring the presence of all other¯rms other than its direct neighbors. If¯rm i prices its good such that¯rm i ¡ 1 or¯rm i + 1 is out of the market
Hence, the critical part of the proof of equilibrium existence is the quasi-concavity of pro¯t functions1 i (p i¡1 ; p i ; p i+1 ). Results are analogous to the ones derived in this paper (see also Peitz, 1998) . In environments where vertical elements of product di®erentiation such as quality play a role one might want to allow for a correlation between a,¯, and µ 1 . Such an extension is possible for particular speci¯cations.
The model allows for unrestricted individual demand functions. Alternatively, one might want to work with shape restrictions on individual demand which are preserved under aggregation (this corresponds to assumptions on the third derivative of the utility function). This has been done by Dierker (1991, Proposition 6) who provides a more general condition on individual demand than unit elastic demand which is for instance satis¯ed by CES utility functions. If mean demand of each type µ 1 is log-concave in logarithmic price on a set of consumers of measure 1, i.e. for a subset of £ 1 which is of full measure the price elasticity of the mean demand of type µ 1 is nonincreasing, equilibrium existence can be shown without the heterogeneity assumptions (m 1 or m 2 small) made in this paper.
In addition to the results on equilibrium existence, a su±cient condition for dominance solvability has been provided, which implies monotone comparative statics results. It should be pointed out that an initial price vector converges to the unique equilibrium price vector of the stage-game under a large class of learning rules (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1991) . Suppose for example that learning is \slow", i.e. in period t¯rms deviate with positive probability from the previous price p t¡1 i . If this deviation is the best response to p t¡1 ¡i , prices will converge to p ¤ in a probabilistic sense as time goes to in¯nity (this result can be generalized).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (see Dierker, 1991) . Take i = 1. Analogously for i > 1. De¯ne the convex sets
] for all j 2 N; j 6 = 1g;
De¯neg 1 (µ 12 ; : : : ; µ 1n ; log p 1 ) = g 1 (µ 12 + log p 1 ; : : : ; µ 1n + log p 1 ). Since log g 1 is concave, so is logg 1 . One has 
Proof. Let me¯rst show that pro¯t is strictly log-concave in its logarithmic price where demand is strictly positive and price larger marginal cost. Consider¯rm 1. The proof goes through for all i 2 N . Lemma 1 says that G 1 is log-concave in log p 1 . log(p 1 ¡ c 1 ) ¡ log p 1 is strictly concave in log p 1 (see Remark 1) . Now look at quasi-concavity of pro¯ts for all cases. Quasi-concavity is violated if there exists a p i0 , p i1 , and p i¸w ith c i · p i0 < p i1 and p i¸=¸pi0 +(1¡¸)p i1 ,¸2 (0; 1) such that
Two cases remain to be considered. Case i) p i0 = c i . The¯rst inequality requires that p i¸< c i which is a contradiction.
Case ii) p i0 > c i . Keep p ¡i¯x ed. For G i ((log p j ¡ log p i1 ) j6 =i ) = 0 the second inequality requires p i¸< c i which is a contradiction. I already showed that pro¯t is log-concave in its logarithmic price where demand is strictly positive and price larger marginal cost. As the logarithmic function is monotonic pro¯ts are quasi-concave. 2
De¯nition The best response correspondence R is de¯ned as
where
Lemma 5 Let pro¯t functions be quasi-concave in their own price. There exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for c i · p i · z.
Proof. The best response correspondence R is a correspondence with compact convex domain into itself. Since pro¯t functions are continuous the best response correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous. The quasi-concavity of the pro¯t functions guarantees that R is convex-valued. Hence, one can make use of Kakutani's xed point theorem which says that there exists a p
Case i). If there were a j, j 6 = i, with log p 
It is not in the interest of the¯rm to set p i > z¸p
Since this inequality is satis¯ed, a deviation from p ¤ i is not pro¯table and one has 
in the speci¯cation with bounded rational consumers.
Proof. Suppose there is
As in the proof of Lemma 6. Case ii). Part (i) following the proof of Lemma 6. log z + µ ij · log p ¤ j for all j, j 6 = i. p i > z¸p ¤ j leads to a pro¯t for¯rm i of
As in the proof of Lemma 6 one must have, for all j, log p i < log p ¤ j ¡ µ ij which is equivalent to p i < p 
>From the de¯nition of p i and p 0 i it follows that log p i ¡log p 0 i · µ ij ¡2 µ ij . Hence, for any ² > 0 one can¯nd an m 2 su±ciently small such that jlog B 0 (p i ) ¡ log B 0 (p 0 i )j < log(1 + ²). It remains to be shown that
= log p ¤ k > log z + µ ik for m 2 su±ciently small. (From the proof of Lemma 6 it is clear that at two di®erent steps there is room for eliminating ².) In summary, one has
Proof of Remark 5.
It has to be shown that d 2 log G(μ)=dμ 2 · ¡· which is implied by
As h is concave:
Hence, ¡e 
e ² > 0 if jE(q i )j can be made arbitrarily small.
(ii) jE(q i )j can be made arbitrarily small: for any positive number one can¯nd a value for m 2 su±ciently small such that jE(q i )j is less than this number.
2°2 > e ² for m 2 su±ciently small.
(iii) It remains to be shown that the left-hand side of inequality (5) can be made arbitrarily small in absolute value.
Remark that D(q i ) · 1. By (A.1) g i and its partial derivatives are uniformly bounded from above. This implies that jdD(q i )=dq i j and jd 2 D(q i )=dq 2 i j are uniformly bounded from above. It remains to be shown that jE(q i )j, jdE(q i )=dq i j, and jd 2 E(q i )=dq 2 i j can be made arbitrarily small. From part (ii) it follows that jE(q i )j can be made arbitrarily small.
(iv) jdE(q i )=dq i j can be made arbitrarily small: B(e q i ; µ i1 ) ¡ B 0 (e q i ) B 0 (e q i ) g i (µ i1 ; : : : ; µ i;j¡1 ; q j ¡ q i ; µ i;j+1 ; : : : ; µ in )dµ i1 ¢ ¢ ¢ dµ i;j¡1 dµ i;j+1 ¢ ¢ ¢ dµ in As shown in part (ii) of the proof j(B(p i ; µ i1 ) ¡ B 0 (p i ))=B 0 (p i )j can be made arbitrarily small. Since by (A.1) g i is uniformly bounded from above it remains to be shown that the¯rst additive term can be made arbitrarily small in absolute value. . G i ((log p j ¡ log p i ) j6 =i ) is log-concave in log p j , j 6 = i.
Proof. (following Proposition 5 by Dierker, 1991, for n¯rms). Take i = 1. Analogously for i > 1. Take j = 2. Analogously for i 6 = 1, j 6 = i. De¯ne the convex setÇ 12 = fµ 1 jµ 12 · ¡ log p 1 ; µ 1k · log p k ¡ log p 1 ; for k¸3; µ 1j 2 [µ 1j ; µ 1j ] for all j 2 N; j 6 = 1g:
De¯neģ 12 (µ 12 ; : : : ; µ 1n ; log p 2 ) = g 1 (µ 12 ¡ log p 2 ; µ 13 ; : : : ; µ 1n ). Since log g 1 is concave in log p 2 , so is logģ 12 . One has log G 1 ((log p j ¡ log p 1 ) j2N;j6 =1 ) = Z Proof of Proposition 2. (i) By Tarski's¯xed point theorem and Proposition 1 there exists a¯xed point in e ¡ = fN; e Q; (log ¼ i ; i 2 N )g where e Q is a complete lattice which is a subset of £ i2N [log c i ; 1)\flog pj log p j ¡log p i · µ ij g. e P is de¯ned accordingly. Such a¯xed point is an equilibrium on e P . It remains to be shown that one can construct a set e P such that an equilibrium given the restricted set of strategy pro¯les e P is also an equilibrium given the set of strategy pro¯les < strategy sets e P = £ i2N [c i ; z 0 ) \ f(p i ) i2N j log p j ¡ log p i · µ ij g. Denote e P i (p ¡i ) = fp i j(p i ; p ¡i ) 2 e P g. The result is shown if¯rms do not set prices outside the set e P i (p Clearly, at a price e p i , G i ((log p ¤ j ¡ log e p i ) j6 =i ) = 1. Since p ¤ is an equilibrium price vector in e P , one has
A pro¯t maximizing deviation has to be a price p i such that z 0 ¡ µ ij¸p i¸z 0 for
